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ABSTRACT 
 
Cybersecurity is an issue of increasing concern since the events of September 11th.  Many 
questions have been raised concerning the security of the Internet and the rest of US’s 
information infrastructure.  This paper begins to examine the issue by analyzing the Internet’s 
autonomous system (AS) map.  Using the AS map, malicious infections are simulated and 
different defense strategies are considered in a cost benefit framework.  The results show that 
protecting the most connected nodes provides significant gains in security and that after the small 
minority of the most connected nodes are protected there are diminishing returns for further 
protection.  Although if parts of the small minority of the most connected firm are not protected, 
such as non-US firms, protection levels are significantly decreased. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Internet is an amalgam of thousands of interconnected networks.  Some of these networks 
are vast global networks like Worldcom (MCI) or Cable & Wireless while others are small local 
networks like a university.  The individual networks that compose the Internet are commonly 
called autonomous systems (AS) and number roughly 12,000 active AS’s with 22,000 assigned 
and roughly 65,000 AS’s possible (based on a 16 bit number) (1).  The task of trying to provide a 
minimum level of security for all these networks is a daunting effort, but one that has been 
increasingly highlighted as an area of importance for national security (2-4).  Innovative 
approaches are called for to tackle a problem of such a large scale and increasingly global nature.  
Recently, researchers in the many fields have begun work concerning the fundamental structure 
of complex interaction of the networks that comprise the Internet (5-8).  Much of the work has 
revolved around the finding that the Internet at the AS and router level form a scale free network 
(5,9).  An understanding of the mechanics underlying the growth and evolution of the Internet 
provides a new perspective for the role policy can play in helping foster a more secure Internet.  
A review of the literature pertaining to complex networks will be discussed with specific 
emphasis on implications for security in networks.  The goal of this paper is to investigate 
possible least effort strategies to protect the network with a minimal level of intervention.  The 
research will then be placed into the context of the current policy debate over cybersecurity.   
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ATTACK EFFECTS AND INTERNET STRUCTURE 
 
 
On Saturday January 15th 2003 at 5:30 UTC the SQL Slammer worm emerged from somewhere 
in East Asia and propagated around the globe, doubling every 8.5 seconds and infecting 90% of 
vulnerable machines in under 10 minutes (10).  While the SQL Slammer did not carry a 
malicious payload, the sheer amount of traffic it produced swamped networks causing 13,000 
Bank of America ATMs to become disconnected, cancelled airline flights, and disrupted 
elections and 911 services.  The spread of SQL slammer worm was a warning of not only the 
speed and scope of malicious worms but the level of interdependency of the Internet with other 
critical infrastructures (banking and finance, transportation, medical, public safety and 
governance).  The speed of the worm is all the more confounding when the spread and the 
complexity of infrastructure it traversed is considered.   
 
The individual autonomous systems that compose the Internet broadly fall under three 
categories: 
 
· Stub AS: It is connected to only one other AS. For routing purposes it is treated as 
part of the parent AS.  
 
· Multihomed AS: It is connected to more than one other AS, but does not allow 
transit traffic. Internally generated traffic can be routed to any of the connected 
ASs. It is used in large corporate networks that have a number of Internet 
connections, but do not want to carry traffic for others.  
 
· Transit AS: It is connected to more than one other AS and it can be used to carry 
transit traffic between other AS's.  (11) 
 
In addition to a basic typology AS’s are often ranked into tiers, from 1-5.  The tier 1 AS’s are 
global networks, down to tier 5 networks consisting of local area networks for organizations and 
firms.  The complexity of the Internet’s infrastructure is daunting; these networks reside in 
numerous countries and fall under a wide variety of jurisdictions and most often are subject to 
little to no regulation, oversight or central control.   
 
 
ERROR AND ATTACK TOLERANCE OF COMPLEX NETWORKS 
 
 
Scale free networks have many implications, but a far-reaching consequence of their unique 
structure is they are very fault tolerant but also susceptible to attack (12).  Specifically, a scale 
free network model remains connected when up to 80% of nodes are randomly removed from the 
network, but when the most connected nodes are removed the average path length of the network 
increases rapidly, doubling its original value when the top 5% of nodes are removed (12).  In 
short, targeting the most connected nodes can cause significant damage to a scale free network, 
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making them highly susceptible to a coordinated and targeted attack against them.  Albert et al’s 
work was complimented by the analysis of Callaway et al (13) modeling network robustness and 
fragility as a percolation and by Cohen et al (14) using related methodologies.  Preliminary 
analyses of these models on spatial network data have shown similar results when cities are the 
nodes and fiber connections between them are the links (15).  When the most connected cities 
are targeted for attack the network degrades rapidly.   Increased interconnection cooperation 
among IP transit providers reduces these effects (16).  Utilizing a different model of node 
connectivity and path availability Grubesic et al (17) find that the disconnection of a major hub 
city can cause the disconnection of peripheral cities from the network.  Spatial analysis of 
network failure has also been done for airline networks finding similar results for the Indian 
airline network (18).   
 
 
THE SPREAD OF VIRUSES AND WORMS IN COMPLEX NETWORKS 
 
 
The scale free structure of the Internet also has implications for how viruses and worms are 
propagated throughout the network.  Viruses and worms are not trivial computer nuisances, but 
high-cost problems: 
 
By the end of August, the cost of virus attacks in 2001 totaled nearly $10.7 billion, according 
to researchers at Computer Economics. In previous years, computer viruses have done quite a bit 
of financial damage, the group says. During 2000, virus attacks cost an estimated $17.1 billion, 
with the Love Bug and its 50 variants doing about $8.7 billion worth of harm. And in 1999, the 
estimated damage was reported to be $12.1 billion…Code Red accounted for $2.6 billion in 
damage -- $1.5 billion in lost productivity and $1.1 billion in clean-up costs (19). 
 
The high cost of virus and worm attacks on the Internet and connected businesses highlights 
the importance of understanding the nature of how these attacks spreads and what steps might be 
taken to mitigate them.  The scale free and power law nature of the Internet illustrated by 
Barabasi and Albert (9) and Faloutsos et al (5) point to a methodological framework for 
examining the issue.  Analysis of epidemics in scale free networks first reported by Pastor-
Satorras and Vespignani (20), found that a wide range of scale free networks did not have an 
epidemic threshold 1.  The lack of an epidemic threshold meant that infections would persist and 
spread irrespective of the rate of the infections, however, the outcome is dependent on particular 
structure and topology of networks (21).  This in theory could explain why viruses are rarely 
eradicated from the Internet and tend to spread quickly even when injected from peripheral 
places.  Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (27) extended this work examining immunization of 
complex networks including an empirical test of the Internet at the AS level.  In their test a SIS 
(susceptible- infected-susceptible) model was implemented, where half of the nodes in the 
network were infected and then nodes were immunized and the effect on infection rates were 
recorded.  They found that targeted immunizations performed significantly better than uniform 
immunization strategies. 
 
                                                 
1  The epidemic threshold is the point at which the percentage of unvaccinated people is high enough to risk an 
epidemic. 
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Dezso and Barabasi (22) directly addresses the prospects of stopping such viruses, finding 
that traditional methods did not succeed is slowing spreading rates or eradicating viruses.  The 
authors’ instead found that selectively protecting the most connected nodes in the network could 
restore an epidemic threshold and “potentially eradicate a virus” (p.1).  The study also points that 
a policy approach based on a “protect the hubs” strategy is cost effective, expending resources on 
only a few targeted nodes (22 p.3).  The Dezsos and Barabasi (22) study, based on theoretical 
models instead of empirical data, leaves some question of how effective their strategy would be 
with actual networks.  A recent study by Newman et al (23) studied a 16,881-user email network 
to determine how viruses would spread across the network.  While the structure of the network 
was not the power law distribution seen in the theoretical scale free models discussed above, the 
network’s exponential distribution still reacted similarly to the predicted models.  Protecting the 
most connected email users (in the form of anti-virus software or other measures) in the network 
had significantly better results than randomly protecting users across the network.   
 
The collective work on the nature of complex networks and spread of worm/virus points to a 
possible fruitful approach for policies that could help provide greater cybersecurity.  Questions, 
though, still remain as to: how a “protect the hubs” strategy would play out across the Internet as 
whole and what level of protection would be needed to gain the maximum level of security with 
the minimal level of investment.  Is there a distinctive phase transition where protecting a certain 
percentage of nodes results in a big jump in overall network security?  Further, considering the 
global nature of the Internet can any one country implement policies that would affect enough of 
the network to make an appreciable impact on global network security.   
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In order to accomplish this task the problem will be simplified and examined at a macro level.  
The approach will be to examine the AS level topology of the Interne t to determine what 
minimal level of protection will be required to protect the overall health of the network and 
prevent the wide scale spread of malicious infections.  AS nodes will be selected for protection 
(i.e. when a worm encounters the node it will not become infected or pass along the node to 
others) and the selection will be tested to see how it affects the spread of an infection in the 
network.  This approach looks at proactive measures to stop malicious infection, instead of 
previous research that examines containing or eliminating existing worms (27, 28).  Considering 
the rapid spread of the SQL Slammer worm this could be a worthwhile path of investigation.  
From a higher level the simulation does not aim to replicate any specific malicious infection but 
instead illustrate the effectiveness of strategies and which networks would be the most beneficial 
to protect, by whatever available means.  The AS’s selected for protection will be first random 
and second based on their connectivity in the network.  The threshold of AS’s needed for 
protection will then be tested to determine at what point an acceptable level protection has been 
achieved.  If the “protect the hubs” strategy proves a prudent strategy, further tests will be 
employed to determine what percentage of hubs is required for a least effort strategy to provide 
an adequate level of cybersecurity.  Since it was not possible to acquire cost data for protection 
least effort is simply defined as the minimal number AS’s that need to be protected.  It is 
assumed there would be a wide variation in cost depending on the size of the AS.  Further, how 
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these AS’s would be protected will not be endeavored, and the non-realistic assumption of 100% 
protection will first be assumed. 
 
Each node in the network analyzed will be an individual autonomous system connected to the 
Internet.  The data for this analysis was obtained from the University of Michigan’s Internet 
Topology Project2 and is based on data extracted form Oregon Route views on September 30th, 
2001 and consists of 11,955 individual autonomous systems.  The AS data was then analysed 
utilizing two different approaches a weak worm and a strong worm.  Worm, in this case, is just a 
generic term for a malicious infection that affects the Internet at a network level as opposed to a 
virus, which typically is transmitted through email. The simulation is intended to look at how 
infections spread from one firm’s network to another and not at the IP address level that worms 
have used to propagate in the past.  The weak worm and strong worm will both be run with a 
“protect the hubs strategy” with the most connected node being protected first, the next most 
protected second, and so on.  For purposes of simplicity the protected nodes in these simulations 
will be referred to as the “core”.  The algorithm for the weak and strong worms is listed below: 
 
 
WEAK WORM ALGORITHM 
 
 
1. Input: AS network of n nodes 
2. Represent n nodes as a vector V = [v1,v2,….vn]. 
3. Assign a value +1 to each node of V so as to identify these nodes as NOT 
INFECTED. 
4. Initialize empty vectors PROTCORE  PC, the FIFO queue POTINFECTED PI 
and  reinfection counter r and revisit-protected-core counter u to zero.  
5. Initialize immediate neighbor vectors B and S. 
6. Pick a random node vi from V such that vi Ï PC. 
7. Remove vi from V and add it to PROTCORE PC and assign a value of 0 to 
identify this  node as being part of the protected core.  
8. Pick a random node vj from V. 
9. Remove node vj from V and put node vj in the vector INFECTED I. 
10. Assign a value of  –1 to vj 
11. Find immediate neighbors S of vj and put them in a FIFO queue POTINFECTED 
PI. 
12. While PI(1) ¹ vj 
13. Remove first node k = PI(1) from PI. 
14. If k Î PC, then u = u + 1  %  Its already in the protected core  
15. Else If k Î I then r = r +1 % Its reinfection  
16. Else add it to vector INFECTED I and assign a value of –1. 
17. Find immediate neighbors B of k and add them to FIFO PI. 
18. IF PI ¹ [ ] (not empty) go to step 12.  
                                                 
2  This project is supported in part by NSF Grant No. ANI-0082287, by ONR Grant No. N000140110617, and by 
AT&T Research. 
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19. Else Output: r, u, I and PC and break out of the loop beginning in step 6, else 
Goto setp 6. 
 
Thus, as soon as the infection points back to the very first node that started infection, the 
process of infection is stopped.   
 
 
STRONG WORM 
 
 
1. Input: AS network of n nodes. 
2. Compute the connectivity vector V for a given AS network.  
3. Sort the vector V such that V= [v1,v2,….vn], where v1 > v2> …>vn; 
4. Assign a value +1 to each node of V so as to identify these nodes as NOT 
INFECTED. 
5. Initialize empty vectors PROTCORE  PC, the FIFO queue POTINFECTED PI 
and  reinfection counter r and revisit-protected-core counter u to zero.  
6. Initialize immediate neighbor vector B and S. 
7. Select an arbitrary number of top m nodes from V and call this CORE C such that 
C = [c1 , c2, ….cm] where m << n.  
8. For i =1 to m pick node ci from C and put it in PROTCORE PC and assign a 
value of 0 to identify as being part of the protected core.  
9. Pick a random node vj from V such that vj Ï PC. 
10. Remove node vj from V and put node vj in the vector INFECTED I. 
11. Assign a value of  –1 to vj. 
12. Find immediate neighbors S of vj and put them in a FIFO queue POTINFECTED 
PI. 
13. Remove node k = PI(1) from PI.  
14. If k Î PC, then u = u+1  %%  Its already in the protected core  
15. Else If k Î I then r = r+1 %% Its reinfection  
16. Else add it to vector INFECTED I and assign a value of –1. 
17. Find immediate neighbors B of k and add them to FIFO PI. 
18. IF PI ¹ [ ] (not empty) go to step 13. Else Output:  r, u, I and PC.  
19. Goto setp 4. 
 
To provide a comparison for the “protect the hubs” strategy the strong worm algorithm will 
be run but the protected nodes in the core will be chosen randomly, instead of by connectivity.  
The random strong worm algorithm is below: 
 
 
STRONG WORM RANDOM 
 
 
1. Input: AS network of n nodes 
2. Represent n nodes as a vector V = [v1,v2,….vn]. 
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3. Assign a value +1 to each node of V so as to identify these nodes as NOT 
INFECTED. 
4. Initialize empty vectors PROTCORE  PC, the FIFO queue POTINFECTED PI 
and  reinfection counter r and revisit-protected-core counter u to zero.  
5. Initialize immediate neighbor vectors B and S. 
6. For a fixed number of iterations 
7. Pick a random node vi from V such that vi Ï PC. 
8. Remove vi from V and add it to PROTCORE PC and assign a value of 0 to 
identify as being part of the protected core.  
9. Pick a random node vj from V. 
10. Remove node vj from V and put node vj in the vector INFECTED I. 
11. Assign a value of  –1 to vj 
12. Find immediate neighbors S of vj and put them in a FIFO queue POTINFECTED 
PI. 
13. Remove first node k = PI(1) from PI.  
14. If k Î PC, then u = u + 1  %  Its already in the protected core  
15. Else If k Î I then r = r +1 % Its reinfection  
16. Else add it to vector INFECTED I and assign a value of –1. 
17. Find immediate neighbors B of k and add them to FIFO PI. 
18. IF PI ¹ [ ] (not empty) go to step 12.  
19. Else Output: r, u, I and PC. 
20. Goto setp 5. 
 
When the weak worm is run a node is randomly chosen and all of its neighbors are infected.  
Next one of those infected neighbors is randomly chosen and all of its neighbors are infected and 
the process is repeated until the infection refers back to the originating node.  The worm takes a 
random walk across the network, infecting all the neighbors of each node in its walk.  The strong 
worm on the other hand infects all of the neighbors instead of just selecting one node to follow.  
This allows the worm to infect all AS’s in a rapid manner when no protection is in place.  To 
manage the strong worm computationally a queue approach was used where the neighbors of the 
originally infected node are put into a queue and infected in turn.  As the worm spreads each 
neighbor’s neighbors are put into the queue and infected as well.  This way the length of the 
queue, nodes to be infected, can be plotted along with the total number of infected nodes, total 
number of attempts to infect nodes per cycle, and the number of times the protected core is 
visited per cycle.  A cycle is simply a single simulation run with n number of nodes protected.  
The output produced by the simulation takes the worst-case infection scenarios from 15 
iterations of each cycle.  The results from the weak worm strong worm, and random weak and 
strong worm are presented below as Figures 1 to 4. 
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Figure 1: The number of nodes protected versus size of worst-case infected cluster. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The number of nodes protected versus size of infected cluster with random 
protection strategy and weak worm 
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Figure 3: The number of nodes protected versus worst-case size of infected cluster over 
15 iterations. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The number of nodes protected versus worst-case size of infected cluster with 
random protection strategy 
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This approach allows the testing of how increasing the size of the protected core affects the 
spread of virus/worm across the network of AS’s.   The results of the weak worm in figure 1 
illustrate a precipitous drop in infection clusters with the first few nodes protected, and after 
about 20 nodes protected the change in infection cluster is relatively small.  The sharp shift is 
indicative of the tight power law fit (R2 = .9905) when the data is placed in a log- log format.  
The results seem to indicate a distinct point of inflection where there are diminishing returns for 
further investment in nodal protection.  When this is compared to a random protection strategy 
with the weak worm the results are dramatic.  The weak worm infections under the random 
strategy illustrate a random distribution with little noticeable decrease even after 500 nodes are 
protected. 
 
The result of the strong worm (Figure 3) does not show the sharp power law decline seen in 
the weak worm, but there is still a definitive point where the infection drop off drastically (node 
229) and then becomes largely ineffective (node 275).  While the number of nodes requiring 
protection to contain the worm is larger than the weak worm, the total nodes protected are only 
2.3% of the total network.   
 
In comparison, when a random protection strategy is implemented (figure 4) little to no 
protection is afforded even after 500 nodes are protected.  Under the random protection strategy, 
protecting even 500 nodes results in 8789 infected nodes, 72.3% of the total network.  The one 
large drop in the results is because AS 701 (Worldcom) the most connected node in the network 
was randomly chosen.   
 
The results of this study and particular simulation approach illustrate a significant 
improvement in security from a “protect the hubs strategy”, although the strategy becomes less 
effective as a worm is made more potent.  A needed extension of this work is to investigate 
scenarios where protection is not 100% and some worms find their way through an AS’s defense.  
This would provide an additional level of testing for the effectiveness of the strategy. 
 
There remains another important component of a policy perspective for this research in the 
composition of the top 275 AS’s.  How many would fall under US jurisdiction and would a US 
policy affecting just US firms be enough to obtain a reasonable level of security?  In order to 
begin examining this issue the top 350 AS’s registered with US addresses were compiled.  Next 
a protection scenario was run with the most connected US firm protected followed by the next 
most connected through the top 350 using the strong worm methodology outlined previously.  
The results of the strong worm algorithm with a US only protection strategy was then plotted 
over the same procedure using the top 350 global AS’s – the result can be seen in Figure 5. 
 
The results illustrate similar levels of protection with the US only strategy (blue) through the 
top 75 AS’s, then the global AS strategy (red) begins to protect more AS’s than the US only 
strategy.  After the top 100 AS’s the US only strategy flat lines with over 5,000 AS’s still being 
infected, while the global strategy continues to decrease and largely contains infections around 
275 AS’s protected.  The result makes a preliminary case that a US only policy strategy could be 
an inadequate measure.  International cooperation or policies that can influence foreign firm’s 
security policies appear to be needed. 
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Figure 5: US vs. Global protection with the strong worm algorithm. 
 
  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The result of the “protect the hubs” strategy has implications for policy in regards to best 
approaches to cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection.  Several studies have pointed 
out the fragility and vulnerability of the Internet to malicious attack (12-14).  There has been 
debate as to the best policy approach to the current security shortcomings of the US’s 
information infrastructure.  It has been offered that there are several options for dealing with the 
current situation ranging from regulation, market forces, contract law, standards/best practices, 
insurance, or government mandated procurement requirements (24).  While a full discussion of 
all the possible interventions for security goes outside the scope of this paper the results can shed 
some lights as to which general directions might bear the most fruit. 
 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument from the results is that universal regulation is most 
likely an excessive approach to the problem.  At the same time an uncoordinated approach 
fostering random protection appears to be largely ineffective.  In the case of telecommunications, 
industry wide regulation has been most often justified in the quest to provide universal service 
for a population (25-26).  The results of this analysis illustrates that the universal protection 
theoretically offered by regulation of the Internet produces minimal returns in relation to the 
effort to protect all the networks connected to the Internet.  In fact returns diminish significantly 
after the protection of the top 20 nodes in the network with a weak work and the top 275 nodes 
with a strong worm, which constitute only  .17% and 2.3% respectively of total nodes in the 
network.   
12 THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT WORKSHOP I: WORKING PAPERS 
  
Further questions still remain, how many firms control the top AS’s?  The top 20 network 
providers control over 70 AS’s, so it is likely there are not 275 separate firms to deal with.  It 
was not possible to perform this analysis for this paper, but it is an important extension of this 
research that is under investigation.   
The results presented in these simulations, in term of percentages, can be deceiving, while it 
only requires protection of 2.3% of total nodes to obtain a high level of security the cost of 
protecting nodes is not equal.  The most connected nodes in the network are large global 
networks like MCI, Sprint and AT&T.  The cost of secur ing global networks of this size are 
significant and dwarf the cost of securing smaller campus networks.  Needless to say protection 
of 2.3% of nodes would not equal 2.3% of costs.   
Further, the small number of firms represented by the top 20 or top 275 AS’s would seem to 
indicate that public – private partnerships or selective regulation to address the problem would be 
beneficial.  The difficult task is ensuring that as many of the top AS’s are protected as possible.  
Even with just the non-US networks removed the level of protection is significantly reduced. 
Also it remains to be seen if market forces or even public-private partnerships can provide 
adequate coverage of the top AS’s.  Selective regulation of the top AS’s could ensure coverage 
but questions of equity and hampered competition and innovation could arise. Several of the 
alternative approaches delineated by Hunker (24) could be answers to the dilemma.  For 
instance, if the US government has contracts with a significant number of these networks basic 
security requirements built into RFP’s could cover a large number of firms and also provide 
economic incentive for compliance in the form of increased service fees to cover upgrades.  
Whether this selective regulation approach would provide a suitable level of cooperation among 
the needed core AS’s and cover non-US firms remains to be seen.  What is clear is coordinated 
and targeted security strategies provide far greater returns than random strategies.  It could be 
possible to simulate a cooperate or defect choice with different policy scenarios through an agent 
based model with the data presented in this study, and this is a future direction of research. 
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